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Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Powert
ROBERT C. POST*
REVA B. SIEGEL**
"America is its Constitution.'"
In a recent string of decisions invalidating federal civil rights legislation, the
Supreme Court has repeated the simple but powerful message: "The Constitution
belongs to the courts." Beginning from the premise that Congress's "authority is
limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, 2 the decisions emphasize that
it is the Court's special responsibility to mark where Congress "has exceeded its
constitutional bounds." 3 The Court has insisted that it must impose "judicially
enforceable outer limits" 4 on Congress's enumerated powers, even at the cost of
considerable "legal uncertainty."5
These decisions break with the judicial practice of the last half century, when the
Court employed doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitutional
interpretation, defining the scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight to
Congress's judgments about the nation's needs and interests. No longer does the Court
emphasize the respect due to the constitutional judgments of a coequal and
democratically elected branch of government. Now it claims that only the judiciary can
define the meaning of the Constitution.
t Copyright 2002 by Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel. All rights reserved. We are grateful
for the advice and critique of good colleagues and friends, including Bruce Ackerman, Jesse
Choper, Michael Dorf, Mel Eisenberg, Owen Fiss, Willy Forbath, Phil Frickey, Barry Friedman,
Howard Gillman, Jim Gordley, Linda Greenhouse, Stephen Griffin, Ian Haney-Lopez, Jill
Hasday, Larry Kramer, Linda Krieger, Marty Lederman, Sandy Levinson, Ira C. Lupu, John
Manning, Rachel Moran, William Marshall, David McGowan, Paul Mishkin, William Nelson,
and Sambhav Sankar, and Jed Shugerman.
* Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley
(Boalt Hall).
." Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Sign on antiwar protest wall, Point Reyes Station, California, Jan. 27, 2002.
2. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). For the Court's decisions limiting
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Cf. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S.
848 (2000). For the Court's decisions limiting congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
5. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. The Court warns that "any possible benefit from eliminating this
'legal uncertainty' would be at the expense of the Constitution's system of enumerated powers."
Id. The Court has evidently been more determined to remind Congress that courts enforce
constitutional limits on national power than to identify the exact nature of such limits.
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These remarkable decisions reflect not only the objective of protecting states from
an overreaching national government, which sounds in federalism, but also the distinct
theme of separation of powers. At issue is the "cardinal rule of constitutional law" that
"ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text."6 The Court has been particularly skeptical of Congress's efforts to
exercise its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."7 Congressional lawmaking under
Section 5 raises especially knotty issues of separation of powers, because Section 5
legislation necessarily involves congressional judgments about the meaning of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Rehnquist Court has increasingly come to regard Section 5 legislation as
challenging the Court's ultimate authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. In a
series of cases that began with City ofBoerne v. Flores8 in 1997, and that culminated
two Terms ago in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,9 the
Court has imposed ever more restrictive conditions on Congress's ability to exercise its
Section 5 power. These restrictions reflect the Court's growing apprehension that
Congress may be playing too large "a role in interpreting and applying the
Constitution."' 10 The decisions express with growing clarity the Court's claim to an
exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution.
This article explores the understanding of the Constitution that underlies the Court's
claim to such exclusive authority. The Court's recent decisions invalidating Section 5
legislation invoke the Constitution as a document that speaks only to courts. We call
this vision the "juricentric Constitution." The juricentric Constitution imagines the
judiciary as the exclusive guardian of the Constitution. It allows the Court's coordinate
branches to enforce the Constitution only insofar as they enforce judicial
interpretations of constitutional meaning, an approach that radically circumscribes
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court justifies
these restrictions in a way that fundamentally misdescribes American constitutional
culture, as we show by examining constitutional practice during the closing decades of
the twentieth century, when the Court regularly looked to Congress to anchor and
orient its constitutional judgments. We advance this argument in three stages.
Part I of this Article discusses the recent decision of Board of Trustees of the
University ofAlabama v. Garrett," which most fully exemplifies the Court's vision of
the juricentric Constitution. We show how this juricentric conception of our
constitutional order thoroughly affects Garrett's reasoning and pervasively informs the
Court's restructuring of Section 5 jurisprudence to restrict Congress's role. Garrett
subjects Section 5 legislation to close scrutiny, prohibiting Congress from exercising
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment unless Congress first documents
conduct that a court might find represents a pattern of constitutional violations. By
requiring Congress to act like a court before exercising legislative authority to enact a
Section 5 statute, Garrett imposes a substantial and improper burden on congressional
6. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
10. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
11. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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power to enforce civil rights.
In Part II, we analyze the Court's justification for imposing this burden on
Congress's power to enact Section 5 legislation. The Court believes that Congress
threatens the Court's role as the "ultimate expositor of the constitutional text"1 2 when
Congress apprehends constitutional violations in ways that differ from the Court's. The
Court thus sets up a sharp opposition between its own "legal" constructions of the
Constitution and Congress's "political" understandings, which the Court uses to justify
excluding the political branches of government from matters of constitutional
interpretation. The dichotomy is false and fundamentally misconceives the character of
the Court's own jurisprudence. The Court's own authority to interpret the Constitution
has both legal and political dimensions. As the history of both the New Deal and the
Second Reconstruction illustrate, the Court must engage in a continual dialogue with
the political understandings of the nation in order effectively to exercise its own
constitutional authority. Once we reconceive the nature of the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence, we can better theorize its relationship with Congress.
In Part III, we explore historical alternatives to the Rehnquist Court's vision of the
juricentric Constitution. In the 1960s, and for decades thereafter, the Court forcefully
defended its prerogative to declare the meaning of the Constitution and simultaneously
constructed doctrine that encouraged Congress to exercise its Section 5 power. The
major civil rights statutes of the Second Reconstruction were enacted within this
constitutional environment. The Court upheld this legislation on grounds that
deliberately ambiguated the exact relationship between Section 5 power and the
Court's own interpretations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
ambiguity established the possibility of a lively and consequential dialogue between
the Court's legal interpretation of the Constitution and the constitutional ideals
democratically embraced by the nation.
Although the Rehnquist Court is certainly not obliged to preserve these
constitutional arrangements, we argue that its recent decisions, exemplified by Garrett,
are fundamentally indifferent to the subtle but fundamental interconnections between
the constitutional dimensions of our political life and the democratic dimensions of our
constitutional culture. Garrett's dissenting Justices passionately voice such concerns,
but in the end this is a question to which Congress itself must speak.
I
The issue in Garrett was whether Congress had power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to create damage actions against states to enforce Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 3 Title I prohibits employers,
including states, from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard tojob application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 14 The plaintiffs in Garrett
12. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
13. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213).
14. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360-61 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5), (7), 12112(a)(2000)).
Garrett was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose opinion was joined by four other
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sued the University of Alabama for damages, alleging that the University had
discriminated in violation of Title I. The University defended by arguing that the
plaintiffs' suits were barred by the sovereign immunity recognized in the Eleventh
Amendment.
Recent decisions of the Court have made clear that "Congress may not.., base its
abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated
in Article I," except when it acts "pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5 power."' 5 The
scope of Section 5 power has thus come to define the circumstances in which federal
legislation can authorize private damage suits against states that have not waived their
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Section 5 vests in Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions"16 of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Until recently, the Court
reasoned about Section 5 in terms of the settlement reached as a result of the
constitutional crises of the New Deal. The Court announced in Katzenbach v.
Morgan 7 that it would accord Congress's judgment about the scope of Section 5
power the same deference that it accorded Congress's judgment about the scope of its
Commerce Clause power,' 8 while at the same time reserving authority to determine
whether any particular exercise of Section 5 power violated constitutional rights.'9
The Court began to dismantle this analytic framework during the 1990s. Although
themes of federalism have been prominent in this transformation, the Court justified its
Justices. Justice Kennedy penned a separate concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor. Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented.
15. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See, Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). For a brief
discussion of the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 450-51 (2000).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
17. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
18. Id. at 652 n. 11. Most generally, Kaizenbach held:
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, s 8, cl. 18. The classic formulation of the
reach of those powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are, appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional....
Thus the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes
"appropriate legislation" under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Correctly
viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 650-51. See also Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 119
(1966).
19. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. This reservation came to be known as the so-called
"ratchet" argument. For a discussion of the "ratchet" argument, see infra notes 170-73.
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retreat from Katzenbach in terms that primarily focused on separation of powers.20 In
1997 in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 21 the Court expressed its concern that Congress might
use Section 5 legislation to arrogate to itself authority to redefine the substantive
content of Section 1 guarantees. Boerne held that "judicial authority '22 to interpret
Section 1 must be safeguarded from the encroachment of "legislation which alters the
meaning"23 of the Constitution, on the theory that such legislation "cannot be said to be
enforcing the" 24 Constitution. Boerne accordingly required that Section 5 legislation be
congruent and proportional to judicially ascertained rights. The Court explained that
the test of congruence and proportionality would locate the point at which Section 5
legislation ceased to "remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions" and became instead
"substantive in operation and effect."25
This view of separation of powers allocates the task of constitutional interpretation
exclusively to courts, attributing to Congress the subsidiary role of enforcing judicially
articulated constitutional rights. Whereas the Court's earlier Section 5 decisions had
understood separation of powers to warrant judicial deference in order to coordinate
the constitutional judgments of two equal branches of the federal government, Boerne,
by contrast, imagined separation of powers as requiring functional differentiation, so
that the Court's legal expertise endowed it with exclusive authority to interpret the
Constitution. Boerne advanced claims of expertise to justify limiting Congress's
Section 5 power. It viewed the prospect of legislative encroachment on judicial
prerogatives as more worrisome than the prospect of judicial encroachment on
legislative prerogatives.
Yet Boerne also suggested that Congress ought to enjoy a fair degree of
independent responsibility in implementing its Section 5 power. Although Boerne
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"),26 it nevertheless
emphasized the "broad terms" 27 of Section 5 power and stressed the "deference" 28 and
20. Underlying the Court's growing antagonism to Section 5 power lie two distinct values:
federalism and separation of powers. We have discussed the value of federalism elsewhere, and
we will not dwell upon it here. See Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 486-513.
21. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22. Id. at 516.
23. Id. at 519.
24. Id. "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has
been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation." Id. (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §5).
25. Id. at 519-20. "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.
It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 532. For
a discussion of the Boerne test, see Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127 (2001).
26. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-4) (ruled
unconstitutional 1997).
27. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517. Boerne stressed that "Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."' Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
28. Id. at 536.
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"due regard" 29 that were owed to congressional enactments. Boerne acknowledged that
it has "been clear from the early days of the Republic" that "[w]hen Congress acts
within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to
make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution." 30
Boerne was thus "a transitional case,"3 ' because it both asserted a new form of
control over Section 5 power and simultaneously accorded "due regard" to Congress's
legislative judgment about the form and substance of that power. Boerne went out of
32its way to approve earlier relevant precedents, like City of Rome v. United States,
Oregon v. Mitchell,3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach,34 and even aspects of Katzenbach
v. Morgan,35 in which the Court had interpreted "the sweep of Congress's enforcement
power" under the Reconstruction Amendments to extend considerably beyond the
bounds of what a court might find to violate these Amendments.
36
Garrett, like Boerne, restricts the scope of Section 5 power. It is explicitly
concerned with protecting "the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this
Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees." 37 Garrett
erodes the distinction between legislative and judicial enforcement of Section 1 by
adding a new two-part evidentiary requirement to Section 5 jurisprudence.3" First,
Garrett requires that "the scope of the constitutional right at issue" be specified "with
some precision." 39 Second, Garrett requires that Congress adduce evidence that this
right has been systematically violated. Garrett holds that Congress could have enacted
Title I pursuant to Section 5 only if Congress had "identified a history and pattern of
29. Id. at 531.
30. Id. at 535.
31. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative RecordReview, 54 STAN. L. REv.
87, 112 (2001).
32. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
33. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
34. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
35. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
36. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. Three years later, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000), the Court deliberately stressed the notion that legislative and judicial
enforcement of Section 1 could differ, holding that:
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely
parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Congress'
power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text.
Id. at 81 (citations omitted). Kimel used the concept of "reasonably prophylactic legislation," id.
at 88, which probably derived from Justice Powell's dissent in City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 202 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), to explain how the Court could retain
exclusive control over constitutional meaning while at the same time authorize Congress to
employ its Section 5 power to create rights which the Court was itself unwilling to enforce under
Section 1.
37. Bd, of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
38. But see infra note 41.
39. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
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unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled., 40 This
requirement must be satisfied before the congruence and proportionality test of Boerne
can be applied.
Garrett interprets each stage of its test to mean that Congress must define
constitutional rights and assemble evidence of their violation in virtually the same
manner as would a court. The Garrett test thus imposes threshold conditions that
sharply diminish the distinction between legislative and judicial enforcement of
Section 1, which the Court so carefully preserved in both Katzenbach and Boerne.4'
Garrett essentially requires that Congress act like a court before it has constitutional
authority to act like a legislature. This misplaced requirement creates an unjustifiable
impediment to the exercise of Section 5 power. Congress cannot, and should not,
define rights, or prove their violation, in the same manner as would a court.
The difficulty is visible in the way that the Court applies the first stage of the
Garrett test. Garrett views Title I of the ADA as a statute that enforces the right to
equal protection of the law. But Garrett defines this right as the standard that a litigant
would have to satisfy in order to prevail in a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Garrett observes that in constitutional litigation, classifications
based upon disability are subject to rational basis review, which means that courts will
find such classifications constitutional so long as "there is a rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. 42
40. Id. at 368.
4 1. Garrett suggests, without elaborating, that Congress might enact prophylactic legislation
of the sort discussed in Kimel once it has met these threshold evidentiary conditions. Garrett,
531 U.S. at 365:
Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. "Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the
authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment's text,"
quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
42. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. In articulating its understanding of rational basis review, the
Court implies that classifications that can be justified by "some legitimate governmental
purpose" are constitutional even if they are motivated by "negative attitudes" or other "biases."
Id. The Court thus suggests that Section 5 power would have to be justified by more than a
congressional finding of animus against the disabled; the power could only be sustained if
Congress were to find that the disabled were treated with pervasive irrationality. Two Justices of
Garrett's five member majority, however, appear to cast doubt on this suggestion. Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor write separately to stress the gravity of any finding that
the States in their official capacities, the States as governmental entities, must be
held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody the
misconceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens. It is a most
serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny
its citizens the equal protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is
based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or the omission to remedy.
... The failure of a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new
understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and
intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
... If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their
mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would have
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
This definition of the right makes little sense when applied to Congress. Rational
basis review has always been explained as "a paradigm offudicial restraint, '43 because
it reflects the principle that courts should be "very reluctant.., in our federal system
and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative
choices." 44 Rational basis review expresses the appropriate level of deference that
unelected judges should display to the democratically informed judgments of a
legislature, and it thus has no logical relevance to Congress itself. Garrett
inappropriately transforms the definition of a right that a court should use in analyzing
claims of disability discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause into a framework
for analyzing the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.45
The more or less unconscious conflation of the substance of Section 1 rights with
the distinct institutional context of adjudication was vividly on display during the oral
argument of Garrett, when the Court pressed plaintiffs' attorney Michael Gottesman
concerning the nature of the constitutional violations which Congress sought to
remedy by Title I:
MR. GOTTESMAN: ... As the Government's brief shows, there was an enormous
volume of State discrimination across wide sectors, really everywhere, which is
not surprising if you accept the premise that there are pervasive, widely held
prevalent views that stigmatize and disadvantage persons with disabilities.
QUESTION: Now, when you say discrimination in answer to this question, you
mean-
MR. GOTTESMAN: Fourteenth Amendment-
QUESTION: -unconstitutional-
MR. GOTTESMAN: Correct.
QUESTION: Unconstitutional action.
MR. GOTTESMAN: Correct. Congress had two-three kinds of evidence.
Number 1, it had individual incidents, and it had them in substantial number.
QUESTION: By people who were acting for the State?
expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the
United States extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations.
This confirming judicial documentation does not exist.
Id. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). This passage suggests that Title I
could have been enacted pursuant to Section 5 were Congress to have found "hostility" or "the
purposeful or intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 375; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (Equal Protection Clause inhibits
laws born out of animosity). Although Justices Kennedy and O'Connor may differ with the
Chief Justice over the definition of the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause, they
are nevertheless wholly in accord with the majority opinion that Section 5 power must be
predicated upon violations of Section 1 that would be enforceable by courts.
43. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (emphasis added). For a
discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 462-63.
44. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). See Post & Siegel,
supra note 15, at 459-67.
45. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes. I'll give you-here's a couple of examples. A woman
crippled by arthritis is denied ajob as a teacher in a university because they don't
want the students to have to look at her. That is prejudice of a kind that would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
QUESTION: What was the basis for that finding?
MR. GOTTESMAN: Testimony of the teacher.
QUESTION: Was there-of the teacher?
MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes.
QUESTION: Was there any testimony on the other side?
MR. GOTTESMAN: No, because the State-
QUESTION: Just hear one side and make a finding?...
QUESTION: One witness who says, the reason I didn't get promoted was my
arthritis, and Congress says State-unconstitutional state discrimination.
MR. GOTTESMAN: There are hundreds of these, Your Honor, not one, hundreds.
But broader than that-if Your Honor wants, I'll give you some more. A
microfilmer at the Kansas Department of Transportation is fired, and he is told, the
reason you are being fired is that we have now discovered that you have epilepsy.
He has throughout his tenure there been performing above the standards required
for employment there. Now, Your Honor can say-
QUESTION: That is unconstitutional discrimination?
MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes.
QUESTION: That is irrational discrimination?
MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes.
QUESTION: Whether it's good or bad-
MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes.
QUESTION: -maybe it shouldn't exist, but you think there is no rational basis.
MR. GOTTESMAN: That is correct, and Congress thought that-
QUESTION: On the facts of this case, could the plaintiffs have gone to a court of
competent jurisdiction and established an equal protection violation?4
This exchange is fascinating. Gottesman offers examples of disabled persons being
treated with "prejudice," arguing that such prejudice is unrelated to any legitimate
governmental interest and hence in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.47 But the Court counters that, in the particular incidents cited
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-37, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 2000 WL
1523152 (U.S. October 11, 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Garrett transcript].
47. "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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by Gottesman the state may nevertheless have had perfectly rational reasons for acting
adversely to a disabled person. It queries how Congress could have ruled out the
possibility of such reasons, because Congress had heard testimony from only one
witness representing only "one side" to the alleged wrongdoing. Implicit throughout
the Court's questioning is the yardstick of whether the plaintiff could "have gone to a
court of competent jurisdiction and established an equal protection violation. 48
The fundamental difficulty of conceiving the relevant right in this way is that
Congress cannot conduct minitrials, with full adversary hearings, as would "a court of
competent jurisdiction., 49 Congress does not possess the procedures or the time to
delve into the circumstances of particular cases so as to characterize them in their full
factual complexity. Instead Congress surveys the state of the nation by conducting
hearings in order to make broad judgments about social trends and problems.50
In enacting the ADA, for example, Congress explicitly found that "the continuing
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis." 5' This finding is a
generalization about how disabled persons are treated in this society. It is a
generalization that, within the framework of legislative fact finding, seems to capture
the essence of what the Court itself has several times announced is the thrust of the
right to equal protection of the law, which is to secure "every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination." 52 The Court has itself
48. Garrett transcript, supra note 46, at *37.
49. Id. Yet the Court, when reviewing examples of discrimination against the disabled
adduced in the legislative record, cannot resist remarking that "[w]hether they were irrational
under our decision in Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out
of context." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added). The Court even implies that to reach a
definitive conclusion "each incident" would have to be subject to a "fuller examination." Id. Cf
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 506 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Although the
discriminatory activities were not identified with the exactitude expected in judicial or
administrative adjudication, it must be remembered that 'Congress may paint with a much
broader brush than may this Court....' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)").
50. On the contrast between legislative and judicial fact finding, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 379-
80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A] legislature is not a court of law. And Congress, unlike courts,
must, and does, routinely draw general conclusions.").
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(9). Congress also found that
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability
of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Id. § 12,101(a)(7).
52. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). Garrett announces that
States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special
accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals
are rational. They could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to
job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If
special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come
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instructed us that treatment "born of animosity toward the class of persons affected"
violates this right.53 Yet Garrett disregards Congress's finding that prejudice
pervasively harms disabled persons, because the finding is not in the form that a court
would employ in holding that the Equal Protection right of a particular plaintiff has
been violated.
Because the Court conceives constitutional rights from a judicial rather than a
legislative standpoint, it applies the second stage of the Garrett test in a way that
imposes impractical and dysfunctional evidentiary requirements on congressional
lawmaking. 54 The second stage of the Garrett test asks whether Congress has
assembled evidence demonstrating that a constitutional right has been systematically
violated; Garrett thus seeks to determine whether "Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled." 55 At the
outset we note that this evidentiary requirement represents a remarkable repudiation of
the Court's position in Boerne. The Court in Boerne had observed that Congress's
Section 5 power should not ordinarily be determined by a review of legislative history,
because
judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record
Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
appointed to decide.' As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the
method by which it will reach a decision.
56
Garrett abandons any pretence to such deference. 57 It holds that the existence of
from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367-68. This passage confuses the simple failure to provide "special
accommodations for the disabled" with the reasons for that failure. States may fail to "make
allowance for the disabled" because of hardhearted economic calculations, or they may fail to
make such allowances because of "prejudice." Congress found that such failures, as a general
matter, were infected with "prejudice" and "purposeful unequal treatment." See supra note 5 1.
At least six Justices would appear to conclude that such failures would implicate the right to
equal protection of the law. See supra note 42.
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
54. For a formidable critique of Garrett's evidentiary requirements on the ground that they
misunderstand how legislatures function, see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial
Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique,
Il1 YALE L. J. 1707 (2002).
55. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
56. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32 (citation omitted). See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 478 (1980) ("Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record'
appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings.") (Opinion of Burger, C.J.).
57. For an example of the contemporary Court exercising such deference in the context of
the evidentiary requirements needed to support a state municipal ordinance restricting speech,
see Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1986). Renton held that courts
should exercise "deference" to such municipal "evidence": "[A] municipality may rely on any
evidence that is 'reasonably believed to be relevant' for demonstrating a connection between
speech and a substantial, independent government interest." City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728, 1729 (2002) (Plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). The contrast
between the evidentiary requirements of Renton and those of Garrett is striking. It is remarkable
that the Court refuses to extend to Congress the same deference that it has been willing to
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Section 5 power depends entirely on "the evidence that Congress considered. ' 8 The
point of requiring "a close review of the relevant materials" 59 before Congress is to
ensure that congressional Section 5 power is exercised only in circumstances where
there is a pattern ofjudicially cognizable violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This "judicialization" 60  of congressional lawmaking underlies Garrett's
announcement of a new and startling rule that deems irrelevant much of the evidence
that Congress had received in enacting Title I. Garrett prohibits Congress from
exercising its Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity unless it first
compiles evidence of irrational action by states, and Garrett defines "states" not in
terms of the institutions subject to the requirements of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but in terms of the institutions that can claim Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 61 In a striking non sequitur, the Court argues that "[i]t would make no sense
to consider constitutional violations" by "units of local government," because "only
the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment."62 At issue in Garrett,
however, is not the application of the Eleventh Amendment, but the constitutionality of
Section 5 legislation. If units of local government are violating Section 1 of the
Eleventh Amendment by irrationally discriminating against the disabled, Congress has
power to enact Title I of the ADA under Section 5.63 Congress's authority under
Section 5 is determined by the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not by the
Eleventh Amendment criteria Garrett employs. Congress's Section 5 power
circumscribes Eleventh Amendment immunities, and not the reverse.64
extend to a municipality in the context of ordinances that arguably infringe First Amendment
rights.
58. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. "The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to
show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled." Id. at 368. For powerful critiques of the concept of the "legislative record"
presupposed by Garrett, see Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 31, at 91-97; Ruth Colker & James
J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 115-23 (2001); Frickey & Smith, supra
note 54.
59. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
60. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 31, at 150.
61. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69. Thus Garrett requires Congress to provide evidence of a
pattern of discrimination "by the States themselves," which would not include evidence of
discrimination by "units of local governments, such as cities and counties," which do not receive
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 369.
63. The bizarre quality of the Court's reasoning has led one circuit court to conclude that
a determination that a statute is not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not necessarily mean that the statute is not a valid exercise of
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to local government entities not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the analysis of whether Congress has the power to enact
legislation requires inquiry into constitutional violations by these entities in
addition to entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1253 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001). See Reickenbacker v. Foster,
274 F.3d 974, 982 n.60 (5th Cir. 2001).
64.
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
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The Court's mistake is so egregious as to require an explanation. No doubt the
Court was motivated by an intense desire to insulate states from federal regulation. But
what lends Garrett's logic its cloak of plausibility is the implicit evocation of ajudicial
paradigm of evidentiary relevance. Garrett reasons about Section 5 legislation as if it
were an accusation, and as if states subject to its regulation were defendants in a
lawsuit. Justice Kennedy makes this analogy explicit in his concurring opinion, noting
that "[i]t is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice
designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws.... ,65 Garrett's refusal to
consider discrimination by local governments as relevant evidence of discrimination
by state governments draws credibility from the principle that defendants "charged" in
a court of law should be convicted based upon evidence of their own misbehavior, not
upon evidence of the misconduct of others.
It is fundamentally misguided, however, to imagine that Section 5 legislation
accuses states as though they were defendants in a lawsuit. Courts retrospectively
assign blame and impose punishment on individual parties. Courts therefore exclude
evidence that might tend to encourage judgments of guilt on the basis of improper
inferences concerning propensity or association. But when Congress exercises its
Section 5 power, it is not acting to "charge" or accuse particular states. If Congress
finds that there is a constitutional problem worthy of legislative remedy, no particular
state is stigmatized as if it were a defendant in a legal action.
There is therefore no reason to confine Congress to the artificially stringent rules of
evidentiary relevance that would be appropriate for a court making judgments about
individual liability.66 If Congress finds that prejudice is pervasively present in the
treatment of the disabled by official institutions subject to Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress ought to be able to infer that prejudice is also pervasive in the
treatment of the disabled by state institutions possessing Eleventh Amendment
immunity. This inference would be acceptable to any rational policymaker, and for this
reason it ought also to be sufficient to sustain the enactment of Section 5 legislation.67
which it embodies are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority
to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority.
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress
may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (citations omitted).
65. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy continues: "[s]tates can, and
do, stand apart from the citizenry. States act as neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to
enact laws when their citizens so demand." Id.
66. Cf South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330 (1966) ("Congress is clearly not
bound by the rules relating to statutory presumptions in criminal cases when it prescribes civil
remedies against other organs of government under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.").
67. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) ("In
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'courts must accord substantial deference to the
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Not only does Garrett prohibit Congress from drawing reasonable inferences from
an important category of evidence, presumably on the ground that such evidence
would be inadmissible in lawsuits charging states possessing Eleventh Amendment
immunity with violating the Fourteenth Amendment, but Garrett also reviews the
evidence assembled by Congress that might potentially have been admissible in such
lawsuits, and it concludes that this evidence is insufficient to justify the exercise of
Section 5 power. According to Garrett, the evidence of constitutional violations before
Congress consisted only of "half a dozen examples" of irrational discrimination against
disabled persons. 68 Garrett holds that
even if it were to be determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed
unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken together fall
far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on
which § 5 legislation must be based.... It is telling, we think, that ... Congress
assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in
employment against the disabled.69
What we find most "telling" about this holding, however, is the implicit assumption
that Congress can exercise its Section 5 power only on the basis of the same kind of
concrete and specific evidence of illegal conduct that a court is required to assemble in
reaching a judgment about the liability of parties. If a court wishes to issue a broad
remedy, like a structural injunction, it must aggregate incidents of illegal conduct to
justify the conclusion that there is a pattern or practice of such illegal behavior.
Because courts allocate blame and punishment, they are careful not to impose remedies
without evidence of particular wrongdoing, whether in the singular or in the aggregate.
Garrett applies the second stage of its test to prohibit Congress from enacting Section
5 legislation unless it also can aggregate specific examples of wrongdoing.
The kind of evidence the Court requires Congress to gather before exercising its
Section 5 power reflects a misunderstanding of the function of legislation. Congress
enacts Section 5 legislation in order to vindicate public understandings about the
nation's needs and obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, not to single out
wrongdoers for blame or punishment. In determining whether there are recurring social
interactions that warrant legislation that would enforce the provisions of the
Amendment, Congress can consult evidence of a sort that could not support judicial
findings that individual defendants have violated the Constitution.70 Garrett simply
ignores these legislative forms of evidence.7' So, for example, Garrett does not stop to
predictive judgments of Congress.' . . .Our sole obligation is 'to assure that, in formulating its
judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence."')
(citations omitted).
68. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
69. Id. at 370 (citations omitted).
70. Cf South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966) ("In identifying past evils,
Congress obviously may avail itself of information from any probative source. See Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,252-53; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299-
301.").
71. For a good overview of the extensive evidence before Congress, see Brief of Amicus
Curiae of the National Council on Disability in Support of Respondents, Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (200 1)(No.99-1240). Congress had before
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consider the historical evidence supporting Congress's finding that "historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities"; 72 or the
sociological evidence supporting Congress's finding that disabled persons suffer from
negative "stereotypic assumptions"; 73 or the psychological evidence supporting
Congress's finding that disabled persons suffer from "prejudice. 7 4
Garrett's notion of pertinent evidence excludes sub silentio the most common
forms of congressional fact finding. It does so on the unstated premise that judicially
cognizable forms of evidence are prerequisite for the exercise of Section 5 power. Yet
the Court would not require Congress in the exercise of its commerce power to adopt
such juricentric rules of evidence. Congress can ban asbestos or margarine from
interstate commerce without first compiling a record that consists of an aggregation of
discrete instances of wrongdoing or harm.
One reason that Congress is not generally subject to a requirement analogous to the
second stage of the Garrett test is because congressional fact finding varies in
important respects from judicial fact finding. It is essential that judicial fact finding be
impartial and disinterested. When looking for guidance in policymaking, Congress
may hold hearings in which partisan conflict sharpens legislative fact finding in ways
roughly similar to the adversary system, but the analogy is at best imperfect. Congress
commonly holds hearings to generate and consolidate the political will to respond to
public problems and conflicts. 7s Legislative hearings educate the nation and summon it
it, among other evidence, a 1983 publication of the U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1993) [hereinafter
ACCOMMODATING], and a 1989 publication of the ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, DISABILITY RIGHTS MANDATES: FEDERAL AND STATE COMPLIANCE WITH
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS AND ARCHITECTURAL BARRIER REMOVAL (A-11, April 1989)
[hereinafter DISABILITY RIGHTS MANDATES].
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2). See also Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("persons with mental disabilities have been subject to historic
mistreatment, indifference, and hostility."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 2, 87-88 and pt. 3, at
45-46 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 369-71, 468-69; ACCOMMODATING, supra
note 71, at 17-22.
73.42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (a)(7). See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
461-64 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[L]engthy and continuing isolation of the retarded has
perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping that long have plagued them."); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 5, 50-51 and pt. 3, pp. 45, 50 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 332-33, 468, 473; ACCOMMODATING, supra note 71, at 25.
74.42 U.S.C. at § 12,101(a)(9). See, e.g., School Board of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 278 n.2 (1987) (citing "evidence that 'negative attitudes and practices toward the disabled
resemble those commonly attached to 'underprivileged ethnic and religious minority groups."');
Id. at 285 n. 13 (citing legislative history of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985) ("[t]o be sure, well-cataloged instances of invidious
discrimination against the handicapped do exist. Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model
Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401,403, n. 2 (1984)."); HOUSE REP. No.
101-485 pt. 2, at 55 (1990); DISABILITY RIGHTS MANDATES, supra note 71, at 72-73;
ACCOMMODATING, supra note 71, at 22-27.
75. On the "political accountability" of legislative fact finding, see Colker & Brudney, supra
note 58, at 119-20.
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to action; they have political functions that are without judicial analogy. These
functions would be undermined were Congress required to transform legislative
hearings into disinterested judicial inquiries, much less into trials that issue
indictments.
That is why the juridical model underlying the second stage of the Garrett test,
which seems to require Congress to assemble evidence that might be used to convict
states of violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, is fundamentally misplaced. States
charged like prisoners in the dock would be unlikely to welcome the ADA or to
participate willingly and wholeheartedly in its enforcement.76 Legislative hearings
ought not to stimulate adversaries; their primary purpose is to inspire new forms of
collective commitment. Even if a prerequisite of Section 5 power is a pattern of
constitutional violations, the evidence necessary to establish such a pattern should not
be the same as the evidence necessary to expose institutions to the serious threat of
litigation. Any such requirement would only deter the forms of voluntary and
collective action required for legislative enforcement of constitutional rights."
The evidentiary requirements imposed by Garrett are anomalous. They are hostile
to ordinary forms of congressional fact finding, dismissive of the evidence Congress in
fact gathered, and quick to demand new, resource-intensive, and counterproductive
forms of inquiry. It is exceedingly unusual for the Court to impose such requirements
upon Congress, as Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 8 which flatly rejected the contention that a Section 5 statute was
unconstitutional because its "legislative history" failed to contain adequate
"congressional findings of statutory or constitutional violations":
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific disputes
between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather
than impartial, to make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. The
petitioners' contention that this Court should treat the debates on § 103(0(2) as the
complete "record" of congressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is
essentially a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. But
Congress is not expected to act as though it were duty bound to find facts and
make conclusions of law. The creation of national rules for the governance of our
society simply does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no
76. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 31, at 156.
77. Cf Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 290-91 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part):
The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they
have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action
programs would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet
voluntarily their civil rights obligations. This result would clearly be at odds with
this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on "the value of voluntary efforts
to further the objectives of the law." Such results cannot, in my view, be justified
by reference to the incremental value a contemporaneous findings requirement
would have as an evidentiary safeguard.
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 364 (1978) (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (citations omitted)).
78. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular
parties. Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission
to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to the
resolution of an issue .... Acceptance of petitioner's argument would force
Congress to make specific factual findings within respect to each legislative action.
Such a requirement would mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory
procedures upon a co-ordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor
our democratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the legislative process.
7 9
Why then does Garrett impose such atypically stringent restrictions on the
constitutional deliberations of a co-ordinate branch of government? We suggest that it
is in large measure because the Court perceives Congress's exercise of Section 5
power as potentially endangering the Court's prerogative to declare constitutional
meaning. When Congress enacts legislation designed to "enforce" the provisions of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and when this legislation is predicated on
institutional perspectives that differ from the Court's own practices, the Court fears
that Congress may be interpreting Section 1 in a way that differs from the Court's
precedents. The Court appears to find the possibility of such interpretation intolerable.
Garrett thus frames its evidentiary requirements in terms of the need to prevent
Congress from rewriting "the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in
Cleburne."
80
The ultimate reductio of this approach is that Congress can legislate pursuant to
Section 5 only to remedy violations that courts have already condemned. Justice
Kennedy, at least, may have indicated some willingness to embrace this reductio as the
logical terminus of Garrett's reasoning. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice
O'Connor, Kennedy writes that:
If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their
mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would have
expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the
United States extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations.
This confirming judicial documentation does not exist.8 1
II
Garrett thus brings us face-to-face with what we may call the "juricentric
Constitution," the notion that courts have the exclusive prerogative to declare
constitutional meaning. The juricentric Constitution does not follow from the Court's
holding in Marbury v. Madison.82 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that
because federal courts must decide cases according to law, and because the
Constitution is a form of law, federal courts must declare the Constitution's meaning in
the context of deciding particular cases. We do not question this logic. We observe
79. Id. at 502-03.
80. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring opinion).
81. Id. at 375-76.
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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only that it does not sustain Garrett's vision of the juricentric Constitution, which
holds that courts, and only courts, have the right to interpret the Constitution.
Garrett exemplifies, but does not defend, the juricentric Constitution. The closest
we possess to an explanation of this view is a passage from Boerne, which initiated the
contemporary Court's assault on congressional Section 5 power:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts,.. . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. Under this approach, it is
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. Shifting
legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.83
The passage depicts the Constitution as having a fixed and "paramount" meaning
that persists in history. "[O]rdinary" law is "alterable," but the Constitution stands
"unchangeable." This image is comforting in its familiarity. The notion that the
Constitution was written "to endure for all times" 84 is certainly a common trope for
expressing our understanding of the Constitution as fundamental law. But Boerne
gives this familiar understanding of the Constitution a new edge, mobilizing it as a
reason for attacking Section 5 legislation when such legislation deviates from
standards that a court would use to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Boerne suggests that Congress, by reason of its institutional differences from the
Court, lacks the integrity needed to speak for a Constitution that must endure as
fundamental and enduring law. Unless carefully monitored by a court, "[s]hifting
legislative majorities [will] change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V." Congress will
83. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. We note, parenthetically, that this passage assumes that the
Fourteenth Amendment has a singular and universal meaning, although the Court has itself
suggested more than once that the significance of constitutional provisions might vary depending
upon whether they are enforced by courts or by the Congress. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383-
85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971); Griffin v.
Brekenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United
States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978). As Garrett so
vividly illustrates, this assumption of invariant meaning is a major conceptual underpinning of
the juricentric Constitution. It was persuasively attacked by Justice Breyer in his dissent in
Garrett, when he reasoned that the Court's appeal to rational basis review essentially applied "a
rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress' legislative power," and when he
observed that there was "simply no reason to require Congress ...to adopt rules or
presumptions that reflect a court's institutional limitations." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384-85 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). We have discussed the assumption of singular Constitutional meaning elsewhere,
however, and we will not repeat ourselves here. Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 462-73,495-96.
84. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 665 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
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violate the Constitution as "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means"
and reduce it to "ordinary legislative acts.., alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it."
Although the Court has elsewhere observed that Congress and the Court might
enforce the Constitution differently for wholly benign reasons, as for example, because
legislatures and courts possess distinct institutional structures and resources as well as
distinct forms of democratic legitimacy,85 Boerne imagines the distinction between
legislative and adjudicative enforcement as the potential site of corruption or infidelity.
This is because Boerne imagines the Constitution as the kind of law that courts respect,
but that legislatures often violate. Legislatures, as Boerne understands them, are
political bodies constituted to satisfy preferences without regard for principle. As such,
they lack the institutional discipline and commitment necessary to respect the
Constitution. If allowed to legislate about constitutional matters without strict judicial
oversight, Congress will degrade and contaminate the Constitution with politics. Only
courts possess the institutional competence and integrity to proclaim the stable legal
understandings that comprise the Constitution as "superior, paramount law."
Boerne thus justifies strict review of Section 5 legislation upon the basis of a
particular understanding of the relationship between law and politics in the American
constitutional tradition. Because it assumes that law consists ofprinciples that must be
insulated from the ordinary tug and haul of politics, and because it understands the
Constitution as a form of fundamental law,.Boerne concludes that courts must protect
the Constitution from the corruption of politics. Courts, in other words, must protect
the Constitution from the people.
Although this is a common way of conceiving the relationship between law and
politics in the American constitutional tradition, it is certainly not the only way.
Woodrow Wilson, for example, appealed to an equally entrenched but radically
different understanding when he claimed that "the Constitution of the United States is
not a mere lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of
the age."86 Wilson summons a vision of the Constitution that is proudly political. He
invokes the Constitution as the moving spirit of the nation's deepest ideals and values.
The Constitution is what "We the People" have collectively made and what we aspire
to make in the future. Because it symbolizes "our whole experience" as "a nation,"
87
the Constitution reflects the highest forms of collective life that we can achieve
through politics.88 Wilson thus reverses the valence of the law/politics distinction. He
represents politics as primary and generative, while depicting law as derivative and
potentially repressive. Legal reason can suffocate the Constitution if it fails to grasp the
social understandings vital to the formulation and application of constitutional ideals.
This view of the relationship between law and politics is at least as familiar as the
juricentric imagery advanced in Boerne. It is striking that the two perspectives are
almost diametrically opposed. The juricentric Constitution of Boerne imagines law as
85. See supra note 83.
86. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1908).
87. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
88. "For us," said Franklin Roosevelt, "the Constitution is a common bond." The
Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract (Sept.
17, 1937) in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 367
(Samuel I. Rosemnan ed., 1941) [hereinafter PUB. PAPERS].
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firm and enduring, and it condemns politics as labile and fickle, perennially
threatening to violate the principles of legal reason. The Constitution described by
Wilson, in contrast, imagines politics as a constructive medium of democratic self-
determination, and it consigns law to the domain of deracinated and technical reason,
perennially threatening to throttle the vital impulses of democratic self-government. It
is remarkable that our constitutional traditions should contain with apparently equal
conviction two such opposite images of the relationship between law and politics.
The tension between these two images suggests the volatility of the law/politics
distinction in our constitutional culture. We are capable of prizing law by denigrating
politics, or of prizing politics by denigrating law, but we rarely imagine law and
politics as respectfully coexisting, as they often do. In fact, when we privilege law over
politics, or politics over law, we are testifying to the primacy of different values that
give defining shape to our constitutional tradition.
When we prize law over politics, we signify our dedication to the Constitution as
embodying the rule of law, which encompasses and sustains our conception of
individual rights and liberties. Our commitment to the rule of law requires courts to
impose constitutional limits on majoritarian politics so as to preserve the very values
on which democratic life is premised. 89 But when we prize politics over law, we
celebrate the Constitution as the framework of our self-governance. We do not imagine
the Constitution as a limit on democratic will, but instead as its deepest expression.
90
We signify our belief, as Franklin Roosevelt emphasized, that "the flag and the
Constitution... stand for democracy not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection."9'
Although there are surely significant tensions between the rule of law and
democratic self-determination, 92 it is clear that each is an indispensable element of our
constitutional tradition. The ideals are in fact deeply interdependent. The value of self-
determination requires the rule of law so that popular will does not slide into fascism
and so that politics remains true to the values that animate democracy itself.93 The
value of the rule of law, on the other hand, must be responsive to political self-
determination if it is to retain legitimacy in a democratic state. That is why we have
decreed that our judges are to be nominated and approved by the representative
branches of government, rather than serving as a technically expert, self-perpetuating
elite. Charles Black would sometimes ask his students why Lincoln did not respond to
the South's secession by petitioning the Supreme Court for an injunction against the
South's blatantly illegal conduct. The point of the question was to encourage an
appreciation of how the rule of law implicitly depends upon antecedent political
89. As Andrew Jackson once wrote to his nephew, "all the rights secured to the citizens
under the constitution [are] worth nothing, and a mere buble [sic], except guaranteed to them by
an independent and virtuous Judiciary." Letter from Andrew Jackson to Andrew Jackson
Donelson, (July 5, 1822) in 3 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON, 1820-1828 at 167 (John
Spencer Bassett ed.) (1928).
90. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245 (2002).
91. Franklin D. Roosevelt, We Are Fighting to Save a Great and Precious Form of
Government for Ourselves and World, 5 PUB. PAPERS 230, 234 (June 27, 1936).
92. For a deep exploration of these tensions, see FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND
DEMOCRACY (1999).
93. See Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 399 (1998); Robert
C. Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1998).
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commitments and understandings.
If self-determination and the rule of law are each necessary, and if they each require
the other, it would seem to follow that we ought not to pursue either in such a way as
to incapacitate the other. This principle certainly underlies the deep resistance the
political branches of government encounter whenever they act in ways that seem to
threaten the rule of law. 94 An example of this resistance is the Court's strong decision
in Dickerson v. United States,95 which rebuffed Congress's effort to force the Court to
apply a statute which, in the Court's view, offered an inadequate "substitute ' 96 for
judicially crafted protections necessary to safeguard a constitutional right. Political
attempts to undermine the Court's judicial interpretation and application of
constitutional rights typically arouse such suspicion, even where, as in the case of
Boerne, there is disagreement about whether congressional legislation actually poses
such a symbolic threat.
97
94. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conlde, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39, 53 (1995):
Congressional exercise of a substantive power of constitutional interpretation does
not necessarily undermine the Supreme Court's primary interpretive function.
Rather, the question is whether any particular exercise of that power significantly
frustrates the Court's role. The question is one of degree. . . .Much more
problematic is congressional action that purports to reject the Court's basic
standards or that otherwise works to impair the Court's constitutional function.
95. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). For discussions of Dickerson, see Michael C. Dorf & Barry
Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 61; David A. Strauss,
Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REv. 958 (2001).
96. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
97. Boerne was unique because "[c]ommon sense" suggested that RFRA was a direct
"congressional effort to overrule the Supreme Court on a point of constitutional interpretation."
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437,469 (1994). "That is what RFRA's supporters wanted,
and that is what they got." Id. at 473. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope
of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1196-97 (2001):
Congress's consideration of the RFRA focused exclusively on protesting the
wrongness of Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, a 1990 Supreme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Congressional hearings showcased witnesses from religious and other interest
groups, nearly all of whom attacked Smith and calling upon the Justices to reverse
it. In the end, with virtually no interest group opposition to the measure, Congress
gave short-shrift to fact-finding in order to do precisely what RFRA's interest
group sponsors asked for, that is, repudiate Smith.
Because RFRA sought to enforce the Free Exercise Clause by means of a standard that the
Court had recently and explicitly rejected, many understood RFRA as a thumb in the eye of an
independent judiciary. They understood RFRA to pose a majoritarian threat to the value of the
rule of the law. This may account for the fact that whereas Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000), was five to four, as were United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Boerne, by contrast, featured not a single dissent
from the Section 5 analysis of the Court's opinion. Boerne was authored by Justice Kennedy,
and in its relevant parts joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas,
and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's judgment on the ground that the
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The juricentric Constitution of Garrett represents the opposite danger from
Dickerson. By insisting that Congress can exercise its Section 5 power only if it
comports itself like a court, Garrett vindicates the value of the rule of law in ways that
threaten the value of self-determination. Although constitutional theory is quick to
apprehend and theorize the circumstances in which politics depends upon the rule of
law, it is much slower to recognize the many ways in which the rule of law is itself
dependent upon forms of democratic self-governance.
The root of this asymmetry is the instinctive conviction that we best secure the rule
of law by insulating legal decisionmaking from political influence. This conviction is
manifest in the passage from Boerne that we just analyzed.98 The Court depicts Article
V as the single legitimate point of contact between the legal Constitution and the value
of self-governance. The Court describes the Constitution as responsive to political
culture only during those rare moments when "the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V"99 is mobilized to authorize changes in the
Constitution's text. On this view, the arduous procedures of Article V serve two
distinct functions. They allow the Constitution to become responsive to political will,
and they simultaneously protect the legal explication of the Constitution from the
contamination of everyday politics.
This account of Article V captures certain truths about our constitutional tradition.
The authority of the Constitution does in part derive from its democratic ratification,
and we do expect the Court to interpret the ratified Constitution as a form of law that is
not reducible to simple politics. 1° Finley Peter Dunne notwithstanding, the decisions
of"th' supreme coort" do not merely follow "th' iliction returns,"'' nor should they.
The authority of the Court depends upon its claim to declare law, and that authority
could not long persist were the Court continuously to issue opinions that participants in
the legal profession or members of the public did not accept as within the margins of
the "legal." Justices thus regard "a decision without principled justification" as "no
judicial act at all."' 102
Court had misinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause, but she specifically stated that "if I agreed
with the Court's [free exercise] standard in Smith, I would join the opinion" and conclude that
Congress lacked power under Section 5 to enact RFRA. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the constitutionality of RFRA could not
be decided without a full reconsideration of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Id. at 565-66
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined the parts of O'Connor's dissenting opinion that
addressed the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, but explicitly refused to reach the
question of Section 5 power. Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course it is also relevant to the
relative unanimity of Boerne that the case could be understood as setting forth a conception of
Congress's Section 5 power that, when compared to Garrett, was relatively generous. See supra
text accompanying notes 26-36.
98. See supra text accompanying note 83.
99. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
100. Because law "is a 'relatively autonomous' cultural form," competent judicial decisions
are always mediated by the internal demands and norms of legal practice. Robert C. Post,
Introduction to LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE viii (Robert C. Posted., 1991) (quoting Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 101 (1984)).
101. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (New York, Harper Bros. 1906).
102. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). See Henry
P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1, 19 (1979).
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But if it is true that courts properly struggle to distinguish constitutional
interpretation from everyday politics, it does not follow that the practice of
constitutional interpretation can or should be divorced from the political culture of the
nation. To the contrary, the evolving political understandings of the nation shape
constitutional law through many pathways outside the formal procedures of Article
V,103 and this has significant normative consequences for the Court's practice of
constitutional interpretation.
Seen from the external standpoint of history or political science, the Constitution is
a cultural artifact firmly anchored in the political perspectives of its time. Legal
historians find that constitutional interpretation evolves to reflect changes in American
political culture.'04 Political scientists find that Justices interpret the Constitution to
advance perfectly ordinary political agendas.105 Indeed, the very Justices who were
nominated by Republican Presidents elected on states' rights platforms10 6 are those
103. For a powerful historical demonstration of this point, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
See also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a
Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1997).
104.
[T]he theory that the Constitution is a written document is a legal fiction. The idea
that it can be understood by a study of its language and the history of its past
development is equally mythical. It is what the Government and the people who
count in public affairs recognize and respect as such, what they think it is.
CHARLES A. BEARD AND WILLIAM BEARD, THE AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: THE REPUBLIC IN THE
MACHINE AGE 39 (1930).
105. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989) ("[T]he views of a
majority of justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long with the views
prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country."); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 80-132 (1999); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 72-73 (1993); Keith E. Whittington, Taking
What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 480-86
(2001).
106. President Nixon, for example, who nominated Chief Justice Rehnquist, advocated "a
New Federalism" that would reverse "the trend toward ever more centralization of government
in Washington D.C.," and instead direct the "flow" of "power, funds and responsibility ... from
Washington to the States." Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, in
PUB. PAPERS 1969 638, 642-43 (Aug. 8, 1969); Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the
Congress on Sharing Federal Revenues with the States, in id. at 665-68 (articulating the purpose
of restoring "to the States their proper rights and roles in the Federal system."); Carl W.
Stenberg, Federalism in Transition: 1959-79, in READINGS IN FEDERALISM: PERSPECTIVES ON A
DECADE OF CHANGE 3, 7-8 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1989).
President Reagan, who nominated Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, and who elevated
Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship, was elected with the declared
intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal
Government and those reserved to the States or to the people. All of us need to be
reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created
the Federal Government.
First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981) in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
who are now most earnestly engaged in reviving federalist values. 0 7 Ironically, these
Justices justify their decisions by proclaiming fidelity to a Constitution that purports to
remain entirely unaffected by politics. Thejuricentric Constitution thus enacts the very
relationship between law and politics it claims to oppose.
That much said, of course courts do not and should not respond to political culture
as legislatures do. They respond in ways that are mediated by the distinctive
requirements of legal practice. Competent judges do not conceive of themselves as
representing constituencies. Their loyalty is to the law, as they understand the law.'0 8
The question, therefore, is how the law itself assumes political dimensions, a question
that carries important normative implications for constitutional adjudication.
We begin with the observation that the Constitution is a very special kind of law.
Debates about its meaning transcend the formal confines of the legal system.
Americans form convictions about constitutional meaning that have roots in
constitutional history and memory, and yet that also evolve in response to claims that
citizens and judges make upon one another in the present. Arguments about the nature
of the Constitution serve as a medium in which Americans, both in government and in
mobilized social movements, debate questions of national identity and purpose.'0 9 The
UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH 1989 333 (1989). President
George Bush, who nominated Justice Thomas, was elected upon a Republican Party platform
that reasserted "adherence to the Tenth Amendment" and that stressed judicial deference
"towards State and local authority." Republican Party Issues Detailed, Long Platform, reprinted
in 1988 ALMANAC, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 56A (1988). For a general discussion, see
TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN
(1988).
107. The Reagan administration in fact consciously sought to revive federalist constitutional
perspectives in ways that strikingly anticipate the holdings of the contemporary Court. See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Guidelines on Respecting the Limited Power
Granted to the Federal Government, in GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 36-59
(1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Report to the Attorney General: The
Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation 130-40 (1988).
108. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528,2547 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he elected judge, like the lifetime appointee, does not serve a constituency while
holding that office. He has a duty to uphold the law and to follow the dictates of the
Constitution."); id. at 2551 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting):
Legislative and executive officials serve in representative capacities. They are
agents of the people; their primary function is to advance the interests of their
constituencies.... Judges, however, are not political actors. They do not sit as
representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no faction
or constituency.... They must strive to do what is legally right, all the more so
when the result is not the one "the home crowd" wants.
109. For recent work considering how social movements play a role in the development of
constitutional understandings, see Siegel, supra note 103. For work exploring the constitutional
advocacy of the labor movement, see William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship,
98 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1999); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE
L.J. 165 (2002); Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L.
REv. 49 (2000); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997);
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). On the
constitutional advocacy of the women's movement, see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
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positions partisans assume in constitutional controversies are complex, interdependent,
and dynamic; they are often formulated in response to the judgments of the Court
itself.
Because the Court frequently speaks in the midst of wide ranging disagreements
about the Constitution as a symbol of our national commitments, its decisions nourish
some political perspectives and disadvantage others. Sometimes the Court backs a
position that will emerge historically triumphant. In Brown v. Board of Education,"°
for example, the Court encouraged and consolidated an important transformation in the
nation's political culture. Sometimes, however, the Court backs a losing position. In its
persistent support of labor injunctions,"' for example, the Court lagged behind
fundamental changes in the nation's understanding of industrial democracy. When
interpreting the Constitution, therefore, the Court is in constant dialogue with ambient
political culture. If this dialogue breaks down because the Court insists upon pressing a
controversial view of the Constitution that is seriously at odds with the political views
of most Americans, a crisis is sure to materialize, as it did during the time of the New
Deal.
We do not mean to suggest that the Court's constitutional interpretations must at
any given point in time reflect an actually existing democratic mandate. The Court can
and often does embrace an understanding of the Constitution it believes to be legally
correct, even if it breaks with conventional political views. But we do assert that when
the Court's interpretations provoke sufficient opposition, either because they repudiate
the evolving constitutional vision of the nation (as in the New Deal crisis), or because
they seek to transform the constitutional vision of the nation (as in Brown), they can in
the long run survive only if they generate adequate democratic support. Once the
Court's critics effectively mobilize to resist the enforcement of controversial decisions
or to undermine them through new appointments, those who approve the decisions
must organize to defend and entrench them. The prospect of resistance and
transformative appointments ensures that legal and political understandings of the
Constitution remain in constant dialogue." 2 Just as the Court's constitutional rulings
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947
(2002); see also sources cited infra note 144. On the constitutional advocacy of the civil rights
movement, see William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1821 (2001); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's
Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989); Post &
Siegel, supra note 15, at 486-502.
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
111. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921).
112. Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION 112 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) ("Conventional wisdom emphasizing
'countermajoritarian' judicial review to protect unpopular rights is... shortsighted. Presidents
select judges, and presidents are elected by majorities."); cf Barry S. Friedman, Dialogue and
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1993):
[T]he process of constitutional interpretation that actually occurs does not set
electorally accountable (and thus legitimate) government against unaccountable
(and thus illegitimate) courts. Rather, the everyday process of constitutional
interpretation integrates all three branches of government: executive, legislative,
and judicial ... Courts serve to facilitate and mold the national dialogue
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can shape the nation's political life, so developments in democratic politics may have
significant ramifications for the development of constitutional law.' 1 3
This is a point that we can easily miss when we are in the grip of the vision of the
Constitution as entirely and exclusively law. Courts, for example, sometimes imagine
that judicial legitimacy depends entirely upon fidelity to accepted norms of legal
practice. But this self-accounting is at best partial. In the depths of the New Deal crisis
Roosevelt did not attack conservative members of the Court for failing to be good
lawyers. He attacked them for attempting to supplant the "layman's charter" of the
Constitution with a technical and lifeless "lawyer's contract."' 14 "[Flor one hundred
and fifty years we have had an unending struggle between those who would preserve
this original broad concept of the Constitution as a layman's instrument of government
and those who would shrivel the Constitution into a lawyer's contract."" 5 Roosevelt
went so far as to suggest that the legitimacy of the Court rested primarily upon its
fidelity to the mobilized political will of the nation.'
1 6
The truth, however, lies somewhere in between. Americans have traditionally
understood their Constitution both as a lawyer's contract and as a layman's charter.
When the Court interprets the Constitution, therefore, it must negotiate a complex set
of expectations. As the Court has emphasized, its capacity to pronounce constitutional
law depends upon public perception that it is acting as a court that is primarily faithful
to the law. The Court risks repudiation if the public comes to believe that the Court is
acting in a merely political fashion. But, at the same time, the Court's capacity to
pronounce constitutional law very much depends upon the Court giving an account of
the Constitution that the public can accept as its own. The Court risks repudiation if the
public comes to believe that the Court's pronouncements are autocratic or despotic.
The public is most prepared to submit to the constraints of the Constitution when such
constraints rest on normative claims the public finds sufficiently persuasive that the
experience of constraint remains an experience of self-government. The Court, in
short, must render interpretations of the Constitution that are ultimately responsive to
the nation's political values, yet that remain recognizably law.'"
concerning the meaning of the Constitution.
See also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285-91 (1957).
113. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 103, at 1068 ("Partisan entrenchment through
presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V
amendment.").
114. PUB. PAPERS, supra note 88, at 365. See Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile,
supra note 109, at 180 n.76.
115. PUB. PAPERS, supra note 88 at 363.
The lay rank and file can take cheer from the historic fact that every effort to
construe the Constitution as a lawyer's contract rather than a layman's charter has
ultimately failed. Whenever legalistic interpretation has clashed with contemporary
sense on great questions of broad national policy, ultimately the people and the
Congress have had their way.
Id. at 365.
116. Id. at 361-68.
117. For an historical discussion of this point, see Barry S. Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383,
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The Court thus occupies a curiously doubled position in American life. Its authority
is simultaneously legal and political. Nothing better illustrates the dual character of the
Court's authority than the history of Roosevelt's Court packing plan. During the
Depression, Americans were not persuaded by the Court's reiterated expression of
constitutional limits on the power of the national government; they overwhelmingly
returned Roosevelt to office on a legislative platform in deep conflict with the Court's
constitutional vision. Yet Americans simultaneously opposed Roosevelt's plan to
"pack" the Court. They wanted a Court that was both responsive to the political culture
of the nation and sufficiently autonomous to pronounce constitutional law without
becoming the mere mouthpiece of the political branches of government.1
1 8
The juricentric Constitution advanced in Garrett emphasizes the legal dimensions
of constitutional interpretation while repressing its political character. Garrett
imagines the Constitution as "in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the business of the
courts-an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices
familiar to those learned in the law."" 9 Because Garrett imagines the Constitution as
the kind of law that speaks only to courts, it concludes that only courts can interpret
the Constitution. Garrett thus fundamentally misapprehends the social relationships
that actually endow the Court's constitutional pronouncements with authority. It
understands constitutional interpretation simply on the model of an edict or decree. It
assumes that judicial interpretations carry authority just because they are legal
judgments issued by institutions designated to declare the law.
1387 (2001) ("[T]he work of constitutional judges must have both 'legal' and 'social'
legitimacy.").
118. It is worth noting, also, that at no point did Roosevelt attack the Constitution itself.
Instead he asked that "the American people.., give their fealty to the Constitution itself and not
to its misinterpreters." PuB. PAPERS, supra note 88, at 367 (emphasis in original). For a recent
discussion of the New Deal conflict that explores how the public valued both judicial
responsiveness and judicial independence, see Barry S. Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000).
119. Antonin J. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 854 (1989):
Nothing in the text of the Constitution confers upon the courts the power to inquire
into, rather than passively assume, the constitutionality of federal statutes. That
power is, however, reasonably implicit because, as Marshall said in Marbury v.
Madison, (1) "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is," (2) "[i]f two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each," and (3) "the constitution is to be considered, in
court, as a paramount law." Central to that analysis, it seems to me, is the
perception that the Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other laws, is in
its nature the sort of "law" that is the business of the courts-an enactment that
has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those
learned in the law. If the Constitution were not that sort of a "law," but a novel
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to believe
that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature? One
simply cannot say, regarding that sort of novel enactment, that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department" to determine its content. Quite to
the contrary, the legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of
social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the
Constitution should, as in England, prevail.
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The Constitution, however, does not live in our society as mere ukase. Disputes
about the Constitution often raise deep questions of social meaning and collective
identity that are not of a kind that a democratic society settles autocratically. The
legitimacy of the Constitution thus importantly depends upon its meaning remaining in
an ongoing dialogue with the popular will. Recent scholarly defenders of the
juricentric Constitution have overlooked this essential point.1 20 They fail to recognize
that although constitutional law may be useful for settling disputes, the Constitution
itself is not reducible to this function.
Because the Constitution possesses this dual nature, part political and part legal, the
Court's efforts at constitutional interpretation must also summon a double authority.
Judicial interpretations of the Constitution are always vulnerable to attack as the mere
decrees of nonelected judges, as a form of potential "tyranny and usurpation,"12' the
more so as judicial constitutional interpretations define themselves in opposition to the
"ordinary" politics that manifest democratic accountability. The Court has typically
sought to avoid such attacks by anchoring its constitutional interpretations within the
political culture of the nation.122 Establishing such connections, while simultaneously
preserving the Court's claim to be declaring law, is a major dimension of what
Brandeis once described as the "statesmanship" of constitutional law. 1
23
Alexander Bickel emphasized the necessity for such statesmanship when he
observed that "[v]irtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the
beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and their
representatives." 24 Bickel realized that, in a democratic society, judicial declarations
120. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
121. The New Progressive Party, 20 CURRENT HISTORY 840, 841 (1924). Thus the platform
of the Progressive Party, represented in the presidential election of 1924 by Senator Robert La
Follette, demanded the "[a]bolition of the tyranny and usurpation of the courts, including the
practice of nullifying legislation in conflict with the political, social or economic theories of the
Judges." Id.
122. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2539 (2002) (The
"complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of 'representative government' might
have some truth in those countries where judges neither make law themselves nor set aside the
laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of the American system.") (Scalia, J.).
123. Melvin I. Urofsky, editor, "The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations," 1985 S. CT. REV.
299, 314. Even the conservative William Howard Taft agreed with the need for such
statesmanship. "I do not minimize at all the importance of having Judges of learning in the law
on the Supreme Bench," he wrote to George Sutherland,
but the functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character that something
in addition is much needed to round out a man for service upon that Bench, and
that is a sense of proportion derived from a knowledge of how Government is
carried on, and how higher politics are conducted in the State. A Supreme Judge
must needs keep abreast of the actual situation in the country so as to understand
all the phases of important issues which arise, with a view to the proper application
of the Constitution, which is a political instrument in a way, to new conditions.
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (September 10, 1922) microfilmed on
William H. Taft Papers, Reel 245 (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 1969).
124. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1978).
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of constitutional meaning become fully law only when they are taken up by the public:
[T]o say that the Supreme Court lays down the law of the land is to state the
ultimate result, following upon a complex series of events, in some cases, and in
others it is a form of speech only. The effectiveness of the judgment universalized
depends upon consent and administration.
The Court is often incapable of generating the necessary consent by itself, and it
does not command the resources of administration.1
25
Once we appreciate the dual character ofjudicial authority, the Court's relationship
with the representative branches of government acquires special significance, as Bickel
well appreciated. The representative branches of government have traditionally played
an important role in shaping our constitutional order,126 and not merely in matters
concerning the economy or foreign affairs, where judicial authority is generally
thought to be weakest. It is this democratic dimension of our constitutional tradition
that Garrett would repress.1
27
During the past half century, Section 5 legislation has been a significant medium for
democratic influence on the development of our constitutional culture. The Court's
recent Section 5 cases, culminating in Garrett, have adopted a juricentric standard of
125. Id. at 91-92.
126. Recent works in the field of American political development that examine
constitutionalism in the representative branches include Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTION
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1996); and KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Scholars of American political
development explore the life of the Constitution in the representative branches of government in
ways that those teaching in law schools generally do not-though the list of prominent law
scholars who do not fit this generalization continues to grow. They include Bruce Ackerman,
Jack Balkin, Sandy Levinson, and Mark Tushnet. For an account of the disciplinary divide, and a
review of some of the recent scholarship in the field, see Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics
and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 309 (2002) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
(2000)); Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense ofDifficulty, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 845, 850-51, 904 (2001) ("In the counter-majoritarian literature, the turn to
interpretation and the effort to place the courts in a larger democratic context managed largely to
ignore each other .... The difference may be partly a function of the different disciplinary
homes of those who pursued the two strands.")
127. Challenging the Court's assertion that it has exclusive authority to interpret the
Constitution, Larry Kramer has observed, there is "a world of difference" between allowing the
Court to have "the last word" in a particular constitutional controversy, and granting the Court
authority to pronounce "the only word" about the Constitution's meaning. Larry D. Kramer,
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 13 (2001) (emphasis in original). Kramer
identifies this difference as that "between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty." Id.
Kramer offers a wide-ranging history of the doctrinal arrangements that have accommodated the
twin ideals ofjudicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism, observing, "[w]e may choose to
accept judicial supremacy .... But it does not follow either that the Court must wield its
authority over every question or that, when it does, the Court can dismiss or too quickly supplant
the views of other, more democratic institutions." Id.
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review for Section 5 legislation that seeks to prevent Congress from expressing the
independent constitutional perspective of a democratically elected legislature. Because
the Court now views any variance between legislative and adjudicative enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment as suspect, it effectively approaches every exercise of
Section 5 power as an incipient constitutional violation. The Court has invalidated civil
rights legislation at a rate that seems designed to intimidate Congress in the exercise of
its Section 5 power. In so doing, the Court is deliberately suppressing a vibrant
constitutional conversation between Congress and the Court that has persisted
throughout the second half of the twentieth century.
III
Garrett advances its vision of the juricentric Constitution as though it were
logically compelled by Marbury, as though it were the necessary foundation ofjudicial
review itself. But this is simply incorrect. The Court has never enjoyed an exclusive
prerogative to interpret the Constitution, 128 and in fact throughout its history the Court
has itself employed diverse means to encourage the participation of the representative
branches of government in the formation of constitutional meaning. It has had to
depend upon the political support of the popular branches even to realize its core
mission of articulating and protecting constitutional rights. Whereas Garrett presents
the Constitution as the exclusive preserve of the Court, in this final section of the
Article we consider a variety of important ways in which the interpretation and
enforcement of constitutional rights depend upon an ongoing and vibrant relationship
between Congress and the Court.
The point can clearly be seen in the history of Brown v. Board of Education.1 29
Although Brown attempted to infuse new meaning into the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court was not equipped to bring the nation to embrace this controversial
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 30 As Judge Wisdom famously observed,
128. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002):
The authority to interpret the Constitution is shared by multiple institutions and
actors within our political system, and tends to flow among them over time rather
than remain fixed in a stable hierarchical or segmented distribution. The question
is less whether we should have extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, than how
we should evaluate it and how various constitutional interpreters should relate to
one another as they engage in their common task .... Once we recognize that
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation can co-exist with judicial review, then the
normative case for and against extrajudicial constitutional interpretation primarily
goes to the question of how much deference the judiciary should show to other
political actors in formulating doctrine and evaluating the constitutionality of
legislation and how much deference nonjudicial actors should show the judiciary
in articulating constitutional understandings and taking political actions.
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. See BICKEL, supra note 124, at 92 ("[E]ven now the effectiveness of Brown as law
largely depends on the will and the resources that are brought to its administration, and these are
in the control, not of the Court, but of the political institutions in the states and in
Washington.").
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"[t]he courts acting alone have failed."''3 Brown had to be taken up by a broad-based
social movement and enforced by the executive and legislative branches before its
legal values could become a living constitutional reality. Acting alone, the Court had
neither the legitimacy nor authority to transform popular constitutional understandings
that were rooted in an entrenched system of racial apartheid.' 32
The Court understood from the very beginning that these understandings could not
be reformed by mere judicial decree. That is why in Brown itself the Court had asked
for briefing on the question of whether "future Congresses might, in the exercise of
their power under Section 5 of the Amendment, abolish" school segregation, even if
"neither the Congress submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment
understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition of
segregation in public schools."'' 33 In so doing "the Justices acknowledged among
themselves that, in pragmatic terms at least, nothing would follow from the Brown
decision unless support voluntarily came from the President and Congress.' 34 The
Justices understood that entrenching the constitutional vision of Brown required the
kind of political mobilization that altered the nation's sense of itself.
Archibald Cox was thus exactly right to remark that "the principle of Brown v.
Board of Education became more firmly law after its incorporation into the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."'135 Although our legal system invests Supreme Court decisions
with finality, the Court'sjudgments cannot be incorporated into the constitutional self-
conception of the country until they are taken up by citizens outside the courts. The
democratic authority of Brown derived not only from the Court's fidelity to acts of
Article V lawmaking that occurred in the Nineteenth century, but also from acts of
social mobilization and congressional enforcement that occurred in the Twentieth
century.' 36 Judicial decrees alone do not create the living reality of constitutional
norms, as the juricentric Constitution would encourage us to believe.
If the participation of the popular branches may be necessary for legitimating and
entrenching the Court's considered constitutional judgments, such participation can
also be an important resource for the Court's own deliberations about how to interpret
the Constitution. This point can perhaps most plainly be seen in the development of sex
discrimination law under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This law derived
131. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), affd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis in original); cf Gerald N. Rosenberg, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (1991) ("The numbers show
that the Supreme Court contributed virtually nothing to ending segregation of the public schools
in the Southern states in the decade following Brown."). For a comprehensive discussion, see id.
at 39-157.
132. See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. La. 1956), affd, 242
F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957) (Wright, J.) ("The problem of changing a people's mores, particularly
those with an emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly.").
133. Brown v. Bd ofEduc., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953).
134. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 295 (1992).
135. Cox, supra note 18, at 94.
136. Cf BURT, supra note 134, at 303 ("The condemnation of race segregation in the 1964
Civil Rights Act... bestowed legitimacy on the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education in a way that the Court could never have accomplished on the basis of its authority
alone.").
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neither from the abstract text of the Equal Protection Clause nor from the original
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. It instead evolved from important
changes in the nation's sense of the fundamental requirements of equality., 37 The
Court's jurisprudence of sex discrimination illustrates how the Court's constitutional
interpretations can draw strength and legitimacy from a dialogic relationship to
contemporary political culture.'
3 8
If we closely examine exactly how the Court came to find discrimination on the
basis of sex to be constitutionally suspect, we find that by the time that a plurality of
the Court was first prepared to advance the notion that classifications based upon sex
might receive elevated scrutiny in 1973 in Frontiero v. Richardson,'39 Congress had
been prohibiting sex discrimination for over nine years and an active social movement
had mobilized to secure vigorous enforcement of federal law. 40 In the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress used Section 5 power to apply Title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment to states, 141 reasoning that
"[d]iscrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to
any type of unlawful discrimination."'
142
Congress thus regarded sex discrimination as a serious constitutional problem at a
time when the Court was still using rational basis review to scrutinize sex-based
classifications.143 Eventually the Court incorporated this congressional understanding
into its own legal interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plurality opinion in
Frontiero was prepared generously and candidly to acknowledge the influence of
Congress's independent understandings of the nature of "invidious" discrimination:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an
increasing sensitivity to sex-based classification. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor union,
or other organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate against
any individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer.. . "shall
137. For discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 513-22.
138. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1198 (1992) ("[Jludges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape
legal doctrine but.., they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with
the people as well.").
139. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
140. The National Organization of Women (NOW) was founded during this period in order
to pressure the federal government into enforcing the law against sex discrimination in
employment that had been included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On the founding and early
development ofNOW, see Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 71-102 (1975);
CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at
192-209 (1988).
141. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-26 1, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2000)). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
142. H.R. REP No. 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141 (Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972); see also S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7-8 (1971).
143. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948).
[Vol. 78:1
2003] JURICENTRIC RESTRICTIONS ON SECTION FIVE POWER 33
discriminate.., between employees on the basis of sex." And § I of the Equal
Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the
legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that "[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based
upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration. 1
44
Frontiero viewed differences in congressional and judicial responses to sex
discrimination as an opportunity for education, not as evidence of insubordination.
Had the Court been committed to the juricentric Constitution in the 1970s, it would
have attempted to silence Congress rather than to learn from it. Just as Garrett
proscribes Congress's efforts to extend to states the disability provisions of Title I of
the ADA, so the Court would have prevented Congress from extending to states the
sex discrimination provisions of Title VII.
The contrast between Frontiero and Garrett could not be clearer. Not only does
Garrett ignore the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors, it strives to suppress them
as potentially threatening to the Court's own monopoly on constitutional
interpretation. Garrett assumes that upholding Section 5 legislation that differs from
Section 1 case law would "allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law
laid down by this Court."'' 45 For this reason, Garrett aggressively prohibits Congress
from addressing questions of constitutional meaning except in the guise of "a lower
court." 146 But when Congress was developing its understanding of the constitutional
dimensions of sex discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s, it was not proceeding as a
"lower court." It was proceeding as a political body attentive to the American people's
evolving understanding of their own constitutional ideals. The Court, in turn,
welcomed Congress's active engagement with constitutional questions. In an era when
the Court was beginning to interpret the Constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based
state action, the Court was acutely aware of the many ways that the project of
understanding and implementing constitutional commitments required for its
fulfillment the participation and support of the political branches of government.
Today we have forgotten these aspects of our civil rights tradition. In fact most
popular and professional accounts of the Second Reconstruction recall the project of
dismantling Jim Crow as the heroic work of the Court courageously confronting
144. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted &
emphasis added). For discussion of the role that social movement advocacy played in shaping
the understanding of Congress and the Court in this period, see Serena Mayeri, "A Common
Fate of Discrimination ": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110
YALE L.J. 1045, 1069-79 (2001) (discussing the women's movement's litigation strategies under
the Fourteenth Amendment from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s); Serena Mayeri, Strategic
Feminism and Constitutional Change, at 21-28 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (discussing the movement's interpretive and amendatory constitutional claims; Siegel,
supra note 103, at 307-14 (tracing the ways in which social movement mobilization played a
role in shaping the constitutional understandings of Congress and the Court in the 1970s).
145. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
146. Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Colker & Brudney, supra note 58, at 113.
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popular resistance at Little Rock. Cooper v. Aaron14 7 has thus become emblematic of
the Court's stance during the Civil Rights Era, and Cooper, shorn of its institutional
context, has become a symbol of raw judicial supremacy.148 These simplified, court-
centered accounts efface the crucial role played by social movements and the
representative branches of government in challenging segregation and advancing new
forms of equality; they also ignore the many ways in which the Court itself encouraged
and relied upon popular participation in the project of entrenching new understandings
of the Equal Protection Clause. We have somehow suppressed these crucial
collaborative relationships, and instead enshrined the Court as the primary author of
the modem civil rights tradition. If the juricentric Constitution invoked in cases from
Boerne to Garrett has any credibility at all, it is by reason of this romantic narrative of
the Court's heroic and lonely role in defending civil rights at Little Rock. The
juricentric Constitution perversely, craftily, brilliantly turns this narrative into a basis
for attacking the Congress's role in enacting civil rights legislation.
This narrative, however, fundamentally misrepresents the facts of the matter. The
very Court that famously and vigorously defended judicial prerogatives in Cooper was
also the Court that in Katzenbach v. Morgan149 confidently invited Congress to engage
in processes of constitutional interpretation. In Katzenbach the Court stressed that
"correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 50 Cooper and Katzenbach were
decided by virtually the same Court and at virtually the same time. Evidently the
Warren Court saw nothing contradictory in simultaneously upholding the rule of law
and deferring to Congress's Section 5 authority. Although at times the Court insisted
that the judiciary have the last word about constitutional meaning, at other times it
encouraged vigorous congressional participation in the formation of constitutional
culture. Notwithstanding its pronouncements in Cooper, the Court never imagined that
the Constitution spoke only to judges.
The Court was in fact so intent upon mobilizing the support of the popular branches
of government that it repeatedly crafted holdings that endowed Congress with wide
latitude to express its own constitutional understandings, in the full knowledge that
147. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
148. But cf BURT, supra note 134, at 296:
In his original draft of the Court's opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, Justice Brennan
lightly mentioned the possibility that "the problem of securing the constitutional
rights of the school children by individual law suits may be such as to warrant the
attention of the Congress in formulating laws pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." But Justice Clark objected, admonishing Brennan to omit
any reference to Congress and instead add "hoopla" about the supremacy of
judicial authority.
149. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
150. Id. at 651. Chief Justice Warren's position in conference in Katzenbach was that
"[C]ongress may legislate against discrimination against voting under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress need not make findings or justify its actions if we can justify its conduct
on any rational basis." THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 1940-1985: THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 827 (Del Dickson ed. 2001)
[hereinafter Sup. CT. IN CONFERENCE].
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these understandings would differ from the standards that the Court was prepared itself
to enforce in litigation. The Court brought this commitment to bear not only in its
interpretation of the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 but also in its
construction of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the
enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a
condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing
the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this context to the
insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was
prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the
judiciary by particularizing the "majestic generalities" of§ I of the Amendment.1 52
In the era between Katzenbach and Boerne, the Court fashioned its Section 5
jurisprudence so as to promote a dialogue with Congress about the meaning of the
Constitution. The Court encouraged this dialogue through a variety of doctrinal
techniques that authorized Congress to enact Section 5 legislation, while exempting the
Court from the obligation of incorporating congressional understandings of the
Constitution into its own interpretations of Section 1. These techniques often rendered
ambiguous the exact relationship between Section 5 legislation and the Court's own
views of Section 1, thereby recognizing the distinct constitutional roles of Congress
and the Court in ways that respected the autonomy of each. Katzenbach v. Morgan was
in this regard paradigmatic.
Katzenbach employed the familiar practice of judicial deference for new and
creative jurisprudential ends. In Katzenbach, the Court announced for the first time
that it would defer to Congress's power to enact legislation pursuant to Section 5. This
deference had the effect of authorizing a variety of distinct possible relationships
among the Court, Congress, and the Constitution. Because legislation differs from
adjudication, every Section 5 statute will vary in some respect or another from the
Court's Section 1 decisions. These variations can arise for many different reasons.
Variations may occur because Congress has made an independent judgment about the
constitutional meaning of Section 1 in the course of exercising its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. 53 Or variations may simply reflect Congress's earnest effort
15 1. The Court decided a series of cases that led inexorably to the conclusion that "Congress,
through its enforcement power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment is empowered,
to control conduct that does not come close to violating Section One directly." United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 185 (2d Cir. 2002).
152. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648-49 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the Court's
decisions during the Civil Rights Era, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 494-502.
153. It is a debatable question whether the Court in Katzenbach explicitly ceded to Congress
the blunt authority to define the meaning of constitutional guarantees. In conference in
Katzenbach Justice White took the position:
This is Congress's definition of "equal protection," and it is valid.... In light of
this act of Congress, I would uphold the act. That means that we would allow
Congress to declare what is a denial of equal protection. Without the statute, I
would have trouble. But if it is not too far out of line in [sic] is O.K.
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to interpret the Court's own decisions and apply the constitutional principles they
announce to different practical contexts.' 54 Or variations may have nothing to do with
questions of interpretation, and instead merely reflect the fact that legislative and
adjudicative enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment diverge by reason of the
discrete fact-finding capacities or remedial power' 55 of the two institutions, so that
Section 5 statutes can assume the distinctive character of "prophylactic legislation"
designed "to remedy and to deter violation of rights" otherwise articulated by the
Court. 56 Whether these various relationships among Congress, the Court and the
Constitution are more or less acceptable depends on one's view of separation of
powers.
Katzenbach applied to Section 5 power the same standards of deference that the
post-New Deal Court has applied to every other grant of congressional authority. 57
Just as the Court's deference to Commerce Clause legislation reflected "a strong
presumption of constitutionality,"' 58 so Katzenbach's deference to Section 5 legislation
expressed the presumption that such statutes were a valid exercise of Congress's
constitutional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 The ultimate effect of
Sup. CT. IN CONFERENCE, supra note 150, at 828. This understanding of Section 5 is similar to
the position that Justice White implied in his opinion for the Court in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985):
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.... Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce this
mandate, but absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves
devised standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest....
White also strongly hinted at this position in his opinion for the Court in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 464-65, 468-69.
154. This was in essence Gottesman's argument to the Court in Garrett. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-48.
155. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) ("It is
fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more
comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.").
156. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81, 88 (2000). Garrett still purports to
authorize such prophylactic and remedial legislation. See supra note 41.
157. On the concept of a "spectrum of deference to the political branches' interpretation of
the Constitution," see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 319 (2002).
158. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, Etc. 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (Jackson, J.):
This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to
Acts of Congress. This is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to
deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress
that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution
of that power.
159. From this perspective, it is clear that Garrett's refusal to defer to Section 5 legislation,
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such deference, however, was to relieve the Court of the obligation of determining
exactly why this Section 5 legislation differed from the Court's own interpretations of
Section 1. By deferring to Congress's judgment, the Court could decide cases without
ever reaching the merits of Congress's precise view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Katzenbach deference thus rendered it impossible to know in any given case whether
the Court had approved a Section 5 statute because the Court believed Congress had
accurately apprehended Section 1 rights as the Court was prepared to enforce them in
Section 1 adjudication.
Katzenbach blurred the relationship between statutory and constitutional standards,
turning analytic imprecision to constructive institutional ends. By rendering ambiguous
the relationship between Section 5 legislation and Section 1 case law, the Court
encouraged Congress to exercise its power to enact Section 5 legislation and yet also
reserved its own authority to utter the last word about the meaning of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court appears to have cultivated this same ambiguity by a variety of distinct
methods. Its treatment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964160 is exemplary. Although
Congress insisted that it possessed authority under Section 5 to enact the statute,' 6 1 the
Court repeatedly refused to address the constitutionality of Congress's claim to this
power.'62 The Court nevertheless readily and unselfconsciously deployed constitutional
standards to interpret the statutory requirements of Title VII, 63 and it approved the
wholesale extension of Title VII to the states as "an appropriate method of enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment" under Section 5.16 For decades the Court has consigned
the precise status of the antidiscrimination standards contained in the Civil Rights Act
see supra text accompanying notes 56-58, reflects the exactly opposite presumption. Garrett
seems to assume that Section 5 legislation is somehow suspect because it is potentially unfaithful
to the Court's view of the Constitution. By requiring Congress meticulously to account for
variances between legislative and adjudicative enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Garrett treats every exercise of Section 5 power as though it were an illicit effort by Congress to
wrest interpretive authority away from the Court. Judicial review conducted on these premises
chills rather than stimulates conversation between Congress and the Court about the
constitutional principles underlying the nation's civil rights commitments, and so creates
interbranch relations that are diametrically opposite to those fostered by Katzenbach.
160. Pub. L. No. 88-532, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
161. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 447 n.22.
162. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12 (1977):
Their petition for certiorari and brief on the merits did raise a second question:
"Whether Congress has authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 employment practices of an
agency of a state government in the absence of proof that the agency purposefully
discriminated against applicants on the basis of race." That issue, however, is not
presented by the facts [sic] this case.
See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
163. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 132-40 (1976).
164. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976)). Whether this holding can survive the Court's current commitment to the
juricentric Constitution is an open question. See, e.g., Crum v. Ala. (In re Employment
Discrimination Litig. Against Ala.), 198 F.3d 1305, 1322 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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of 1964 to a kind of legal limbo.
During the period between Brown and Boerne, Congress responded to the Court's
encouragement by using its Section 5 power to enact civil rights statutes that
transformed the enforcement ofantidiscrimination norms into a major responsibility of
the national government. 165 The Court, in turn, systematically refused to clarify the
status of this legislation,' 66 reserving the question on so many occasions that its
decisionmaking appears to have been deliberate. For ease of nomenclature, we can call
this apparent policy of maintaining ambiguity about the constitutional status of
statutory norms the "Katzenbach approach."
The Katzenbach approach served important constitutional purposes. We have
already identified two such functions. First, legislative and judicial understandings of
Section 1 will differ insofar as Congress and the Court possess distinct institutional
competencies, resources, and forms of democratic responsiveness. The Katzenbach
approach allowed for play in the joints 167 by authorizing institutionally differentiated
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment without committing the Court to any
precise theory of the distinction between legislative and judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights.
Second, the Katzenbach approach invited congressional participation in the
development of constitutional understandings. Constitutional culture has evolved in
ways that benefit not only from Congress's unique legislative competencies, but also
from Congress's political responsiveness. Under the Katzenbach approach, the Court
could authorize Congress to test possible meanings of the Equal Protection Clause,
165. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(3) (2000);
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (2000); Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694; Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243; Educ. & Labor Comm., Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-23 8, at 19 (197 1), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2154; S. Judiciary Comm., Civil Rights Act of 1968, S. REP. No. 90-721, at 7 (1967),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1843.
166. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 n. 15 (1974) (deciding whether jury trials
are required under Fair Housing title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) ("We therefore have no
occasion to consider in this case any question of the scope of congressional power to enforce § 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971) (discussing the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which
prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights) ("[T]he allegations of the complaint in this
case have not required consideration of the scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) (reviewing an
indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), which criminalizes conspiracies against "the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States") ("Since we therefore deal here only with the bare terms of the Equal Protection
Clause itself, nothing said in this opinion goes to the question of what kinds of other and broader
legislation Congress might constitutionally enact under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ....9).
Cf Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992) (choosing not to reach
the question of whether Congress relied on its Section 5 powers in addition to its Spending
Clause powers when it enacted Title IX).
167. "We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not
allowed a little play in its joints." Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)
(Holmes, J.).
[Vol. 78:1
2003] JURICENTRIC RESTRICTIONS ON SECTION FIVE POWER 39
which the Court was then able to evaluate before articulating its own Section 1
jurisprudence.168 Sometimes, as in the case of sex discrimination, the Court responded
by incorporating congressional meanings into its own Section 1 standards. And
sometimes, as in the case of the disparate impact methodology of Title VII, the Court
distinguished constitutional from statutory standards on the ground that "the calculus
of effects... is a legislative and not ajudicial responsibility.', 169 The Court could thus
respond as it wished to Congress's understanding of constitutional values. By allowing
each branch to exercise its role in enforcing the Constitution without unduly
constraining the other, the Katzenbach approach permitted the Constitution as law, and
the Constitution as the repository of the nation's deepest political commitments, to
maintain a constructive if uneasy coexistence.
It is not clear that even the Katzenbach Court itself fully appreciated the profound
implications of its own doctrinal method. In Katzenbach Harlan famously charged that
if Congress were given the discretion to use its Section 5 power in a way that
effectively defined "the substantive scope of the" Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
could also "exercise its § 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court."'' 70 Harlan feared that if
Congress were authorized to interpret the Constitution, it might constrain and preempt
judicial protections for constitutional rights. The Court responded to Harlan by
advancing what later became known as the "ratchet" argument:'
7 1
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent... § 5 does not grant Congress power to
exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to
dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court. We emphasize that
Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate,
or dilute these guarantees.
72
The ratchet argument was almost instantly controversial, because in situations of
conflicting rights it is hard to distinguish expanding a right from diluting it, and
because it is baffling why a power to define a right can be effective in only one
"direction."
In retrospect, it is clear that Harlan's challenge was premised on the assumption that
a legitimate exercise of Section 5 power would bind judicial interpretations of Section
1. The very structure of "deference" created by Katzenbach, however, undercuts this
assumption, because it obscures the constitutional basis for upholding Section 5
168. Just as federalism is sometimes defended because it creates laboratories for "novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country," New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), so the Katzenbach approach
permitted Congress to "experiment" with possible meanings of Section 1 without risk to the
Court's own Section I jurisprudence.
169. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272 (1979). In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), the Court hinted that Section 1 norms, when enforced by a legislature rather than by a
court, might incorporate a calculus of effect. See id. at 247-48.
170. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. The label originated in William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 606 (1975).
172. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
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legislation. Katzenbach effectively decouples the exercise of Section 5 power from
judicial interpretations of Section 1. For this reason the Court need not have advanced
the ratchet argument at all. It need only have observed that deferring to Congress's
power to enact Section 5 legislation does not commit the Court to any particular
interpretation of Section 1. The Court can still hold unconstitutional any exercise of
Section 5 power that it believes violates a Section 1 right, in the same way that it can
hold unconstitutional any exercise of Commerce Clause power that it believes violates
a Section 1 right. The Court's failure to advance this argument shows that it was not
yet fully in command of the implications of its own doctrine.'
The Court was nonetheless perfectly clear about what it wanted to achieve, for in
the years after Katzenbach it repeatedly responded to federal civil rights legislation in
ways that demonstrated a readiness to accept Congress's judgment about how to
enforce constitutional norms, while simultaneously preserving the Court's own
authority to declare the Constitution's meaning. Using doctrinal techniques ranging
from deference, 7 4 to deliberate equivocation, 1 75 to the explicit acknowledgement that
the nature of constitutional rights could vary depending upon whether they were
enforced by Congress or by the judiciary,176 the Court effectively decoupled Section 5
power from judicial interpretations of Section 1. Congress accepted the authority
attributed to it by the Court by enacting legislation that sought to vindicate
constitutional ideals of liberty and equality.
This is the institutional background that produced the ADA. The ADA was based
upon a "vast legislative record" that included "13 congressional hearings" and the
report of a "special task force" that "held hearings in every State, attended by more
than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experienced discrimination first
hand." 77 This record served to educate Congress and the nation about the "prejudice,"
the "stereotypic assumptions," and the "purposeful unequal treatment" faced by
persons with disabilities. 78 It served to mobilize the political will to address these
injustices. In signing the ADA President Bush was moved to characterize the
legislation as "the full flowering of our democratic principles" that gives "clear
173. The notion of institutionally differentiated enforcement of Section 1 was in 1966 quite
new and unassimilated. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for
example, Justices Douglas and Goldberg had each written concurring opinions assuming that
Section 5 power and judicial enforcement of Section 1 were tightly coupled. See id. at 280
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 376-77 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The debates over the 1964
Civil Rights Act were conducted on a similar assumption. See Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at
497. Justice Black's dissent in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), is an early example of a
Justice prepared to recognize and accept a conceptual distinction between congressional statutes
enacted pursuant to Section 5 and judicial enforcement of Section 1. Id. at 342-43 (Black, J.
dissenting). For a discussion of the Court's rapid assimilation of this idea, see Post & Siegel,
supra note 15, at 497-501.
174. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 160-166.
176. This was particularly true in the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note
151. But the Court also suggested a similar conclusion in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
177. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,377 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7), (9) (2000).
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expression to our most basic ideals of freedom and equality."'
7 9
The Katzenbach approach authorized Congress to conclude that these ideals were
so precious and so threatened as to merit legislation based upon Section 5 power. At
the same time, however, the Katzenbach approach left the Court entirely free to wrestle
with its own ambivalence about the constitutional status of disabled persons, as
reflected in its roughly contemporaneous opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 80 which simultaneously announced a rational basis standard of review
and engaged in elevated scrutiny. 8 ' After Katzenbach the Court might have upheld the
ADA by simply deferring to Congress's judgment that the statute was needed to
redress constitutional injuries under Section 5. Even after Boerne, moreover, the Court
could have upheld the ADA by independently concluding that extensive congressional
fact finding had demonstrated that the ADA was a congruent and proportional way of
preventing or deterring the harms of invidious discrimination which the Court itself
had deemed unconstitutional. 8 2 But in Garrett the Court repudiated these various
methods of decoupling Section 5 legislation from judicial enforcement of Section 1.
Instead it has advanced a test that effectively requires evidence ofjudicially redressible
violations of Section 1 before Congress can exercise its Section 5 power.
By tightly binding the exercise of Section 5 power to judicial enforcement of
Section 1, Garrett effectively undercuts the many civil rights statutes which Congress
has enacted in response to the Court's own invitation in Katzenbach.18 3 Garrett
disavows the Court's responsibility for encouraging this legislation. What is lost in
179. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990).
180. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
181. Id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See William
Christian, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Individuals With
Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 423 (1994); Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary
Step in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163, 185-89 (1986).
182. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997). This is essentially the tack
taken by the Eleventh Circuit in upholding, under Section 5, the application of the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII to the states. See Crum v. Alabama (In re Employment
Discrimination Litig. Against Alabama), 198 F.3d 1305, 1322 (1 th Cir. 1999). See also Holmes
v. AFSCME Ind. Council 52, 70 U.S.L.W. 1491 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
183. We note that it is one thing for the Court in Kimel v. Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), to hold that Congress is without power under Section 5 to enact the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1974 ("FLSA"), Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74, which extended the protections
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994
& Supp. 11 1997), to the states. The FLSA "nowhere states that Congress was acting pursuant to
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600
(D. Wy. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 n.18
(1983). It is quite another for the Court to hold in Garrett that Congress is without power under
Section 5 to enact the ADA, when the ADA itself announces that its "purpose" is "to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
... " 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(4). Garrett, unlike Kimel, suppresses a fully deliberate and explicit
congressional decision to employ Section 5 authority, and thereby to give practical
meaning to constitutional rights. Congress's effort in the ADA to enforce Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was directly responsive to the constitutional regime established by the
Court in Katzenbach.
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such circumstances is precisely Congress's historical capacity to mediate between the
constitutional understandings of the judiciary and those of the nation. The ambiguity
created by the Katzenbach approach had allowed the contradictory and often tension-
filled relationship between political self-determination and the rule of law to persist
without either perspective stifling the other. By eliminating this ambiguity and
requiring Congress to speak only in the voice of a court, Garrett is attempting to
disable an important mechanism by which the nation maintains democratic dialogue
with its judicially enforced Constitution. This is an historical development of
enormous significance.
How, then, can Congress respond to this assault? Of course Congress can draft and
redraft legislation in an effort to respond to the shifting and ever more exacting
standards of the Court's evolving Section 5 jurisprudence. 84 It would no doubt be wise
184. The constitutionality of Title II of the ADA, for example, represents a virtual law
school exam of the diverse difficulties faced by contemporary legislation because of the Court's
recent precedents. For example, it must be determined whether Title II of the ADA is a valid
exercise of Section 5 power, compare Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280
F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001), with Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2001), Alsbrook v.
City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), Wroncy v. Or. Dep't of Transp., 9 Fed. Appx.
604, 606 (9th Cir. 2001), and Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001);
whether it is valid under the Commerce Clause when applied to local prisons in a way that may
not "substantially" affect interstate commerce, Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. N.C.
1996), aff'd 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 525 U.S. 802 (1998); whether
it is a valid exercise of Section 5 power if applied to violations of the equal protection clause
"motivated by discriminatory animus or ill will based on the plaintiff's disability," Garcia, 280
F.3d at 112, or to violations of the Due Process clause, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. Com.
P1., 276 F.3d 808, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); or to violations of "fundamental rights" like voting,
Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2001). Moreover, because Title II
addresses only public entities, one may ask whether it is constitutional under the Tenth
Amendment due to the fact that it "regulates the States exclusively" and is not a "generally
applicable" law. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). Finally, the substantive provisions
of Title II are virtually identical to those contained in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2000); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), which imposes federal
prohibitions of discrimination against disabled persons as a condition for the receipt of federal
funds. Section 504 thus raises the question of whether Congress can deploy its spending power
"to achieve objectives with respect to the states that it otherwise could not achieve using its other
Article I enumerated powers." Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions:
Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 164 (2001). Compare Armstrong v.
Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2001), Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d
812 (9th Cir. 2001), Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001), Jim C. v.
United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), andJohnson v. Louisiana, No. 01-2002,2002 WL
83645 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002), with Garcia, 280 F.3d at 112-14, andKoslow v. Pennsylvania,
158 F. Supp 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2001). For recent discussion on the spending power, see Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States'Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 104 (2001); Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
195 (2001); Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the More You Save: Can the Spending
Clause Save Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws? 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111 (2001); Michael Selmi,
Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending Power, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1575 (2002);
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for Congress to make efforts in this direction. It can attempt to find the factual
predicates required by Garrett, or it can sidestep Section 5 altogether and utilize its
powers under the Spending Clause or what remains of its commerce power. The
question, however, is whether it is sufficient for Congress merely to respond in this
fashion.
We suggest that it is not. The Court's recent jurisprudence puts directly in issue the
roles that Congress and the Court can play in enforcing the Constitution. It is this
question that Congress must self-consciously address. The Court claims authority to
interpret the Constitution, and, so long as we have a functioning legal system that
merits respect, such authority must be granted. But because the Constitution also lives
as the political heritage of the entire nation, the Court's claim to exclusive interpretive
authority has implications that far transcend the professional boundaries of the legal
system. Although the Court may claim authority to speak for the Constitution, that
authority does not exist merely by decree. It must be earned by articulating a vision of
the Constitution that the nation is prepared to accept.
Seeking to overturn entrenched practices of the American constitutional tradition,
Garrett explicitly denies that Congress plays any role in articulating constitutional
understandings. It is to this core challenge-advanced by the Court with increasing
stridency in case after case since Boerne-that Congress must respond. The four
dissenting Justices in the Court's Section 5 cases are struggling, ever more cogently, to
summon a vision of the constitutional regime the majority is now engaged in
dismantling. But the dissenting Justices can only do so much. Congress itself must
begin systematically to answer the Court's claims.
Yet for Congress to speak back to the Court is no simple matter. At present,
Congress seems disengaged and possibly confused. 85 Although the Court's
constitutional claims are far-reaching and highly significant, the Court has, with the
exception of Boerne, invalidated only carefully selected and narrow bits of legislation.
The Court speaks loudly, but strikes narrowly. Many on the Hill have no special
commitment to the provisions of the ADA or the Violence Against Women Act 86 or
the ADEA'8 7 invalidated in recent cases; some may even think the nation better off
without the particular provisions invalidated by the Court. No doubt also the very
ambiguities of the Katzenbach regime have left members of Congress confused about
their proper responsibility as interpreters of constitutional meaning. Given the
persistently uncertain status of the many civil rights statutes enacted in the decades
after Brown, Congress, like the legal academy, may well be struggling to make sense
of the deep questions of constitutional role and structure at stake in the Court's recent
decisions.18
8
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141 (2002).
185. See Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-
Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001).
186. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
187. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
188. We should stress that Garrett poses a challenge to Congress that is not merely partisan
in nature. The ADA was enacted with "strong bipartisan support." See Larry E. Craig, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Prologue, Promise, Produce, and Performance, 35 IDAHO L.
REv. 205, 209 (1999); Sweeping Law for Rights of Disabled, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 447
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
For decades now, Congress has been legislating to secure Americans protection
against discrimination, bringing to bear on this question the nation's evolving
judgments and experiences concerning the meaning of rationality and fairness. 89
Congress can draw on these decades of institutional experience to defend the
distinctive ways in which legislatures make judgments about the meaning of invidious
discrimination. Congress has enacted numerous federal civil rights statutes pursuant to
Section 5 through which the nation now fundamentally defines itself. These statutes
address such diverse concerns as voting, employment, housing, education, and
violence. As Congress reviews this extraordinary history, it can begin to recover a
sense of the myriad ways in which Congress itself has in the past vindicated
constitutional values.
In deploying its Section 5 authority to protect civil rights, Congress was acting on a
mandate that the American people have not yet retracted. We do not understand the
Court's new vision of separation of powers to rest on any equivalent mandate. The
juricentric Constitution of Garrett stands on quite different footing than the Court's
federalism jurisprudence. The past few Republican presidents have in part campaigned
on the need to resurrect respect for the values of federalism. 90 But no presidential
candidate has campaigned on the need to curtail congressional authority to interpret the
Constitution, much less on the need to circumscribe the power of the federal
government to combat discrimination. Both the ADA and RFRA were in fact highly
popular bipartisan statutes.' 9 '
Ultimately the Court's aggressive new vision of the juricentric Constitution will be
tested in the crucible of public understanding. The Court may assert that it possesses
the exclusive prerogative to interpret the Constitution, but in the final analysis it shares
that authority with the American people. A constitutional crisis would surely result
were the Court to insist on pushing its new vision of separation of powers to impose
(1990). And even if we might be tempted now to dismiss the ADA as merely a "liberal" statute,
toward which a conservative Court might naturally express hostility, RFRA, which the Court
struck down in Boerne, was a statute that generated and continues to generate strong support
from both the left and the right. See Conkle, supra note 94, at 88-89; Religious Freedom Bill
Wins Quick Passage, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 315 (1993); Bonnie I. Robin-Vegeer, Disposing of
the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589,
591 n.2 (1996); Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses
After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 861, 863-64 (2000). The Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Act Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. 102-560, 106 Stat 4230 (1992), which was
struck down in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), was also bipartisan and widely supported. See S. REP. No. 102-280,
at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3088; 138 CONG. REc. S. 8146-03 (1992);
138 CONG. REc. H. 11131-03 (1992). A recent bipartisan bill has been introduced in order to
revive the Act. See Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2002).
In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), moreover, the Court struck down a statute
that represented an unabashedly conservative initiative. See 18 U.S.C. §3501 (2000). The root
question of the juricentric Constitution, therefore, concerns Congress's constitutional role as a
coordinate branch of the federal government.
189. See Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 284-87 (2002).
190. See supra note 106.
191. See supra note 188.
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categorical restrictions on Congress that directly and fundamentally challenge popular
convictions concerning the necessary scope of national power. In the absence of such a
crisis, however, popular resistance to the slow and nearly imperceptible erosion of
congressional authority will depend upon congressional leadership. If Congress wishes
to reclaim its prerogatives as an equal and coordinate branch of the federal
government, it must counter the Court's claims of exclusive authority with a public
and persuasive defense of Congress's historical role in the creation of constitutional
meaning. It must act to protect the Constitution for the people.

